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1 Introduction
The literature on human capital theory makes an important distinction between gen-
eral and specific human capital. On job separation, general human capital does not
depreciate, whereas specific human capital is lost. Becker (1962) suggests that greater
specific human capital should reduce incentives of firms and workers to separate, and
thus it is the key to many equilibrium search models that study the cyclical behaviour
of employment (Cairó and Cajner, 2016). So far, however, few models have direct
implications for the impact of specific capital on real wage variation over the business
cycle in a frictional labour market. In this paper, I address this question by providing
an empirical framework where firms optimally choose how aggregate shocks transmit
to wages based on their workers’ specific capital. I use this model to explain novel
stylised facts about the cyclicality of the postgraduate-undergraduate wage premium.
Beginning with the data, can education provide shelter against wage shocks over the
business cycle? Prior literature has focused on the gap between college graduates and
non-college workers. Keane and Prasad (1993) find that these two groups experience
the same degree of cyclical variation in real hourly wages. Hoynes (2000) finds similar
results at a lower education margin (High School vs. Some College).1 Since 1980,
however, the landscape of higher education has changed dramatically: the employment
share held by postgraduates has doubled (Lindley and Machin, 2016). Indeed, by
2012, nearly 15% of the US adult workforce, or 40% of all college graduates, have
a postgraduate degree. Given the rising number of postgraduates, it is important
to understand their labor market outcomes. In this paper, I compare postgraduates
to undergraduates and document a new pattern: In the US, the postgraduate wage
premium is counter-cyclical. To illustrate, Figure 1 plots the detrended real GDP
and the postgraduate wage premium.2 The postgraduate wage premium increases
substantially during all recent recessions, and its correlation with real GDP is -0.47.
This is because postgraduate wages respond less to business cycle shocks: when real
GDP goes up by 1%, the median postgraduate wage increases by 0.34%, and the median
undergraduate wage increases by 0.58%.3
1College graduates include undergraduates and postgraduates. Some College are workers with
more than a high school education. High School are workers with a high school education and less.
2See Section 2.1 for a description of the sample. Postgraduate degrees include 5 years of college
completed and more prior to 1992 and master’s, professional school and doctoral degrees after 1992.
3In terms of means, when real GDP goes up by 1%, the average postgraduate wage increases by
0.25%, and the average undergraduate wage increases by 0.85%.
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Figure 1: Detrended Real GDP and Postgraduate Wage Premium
Source. Current Population Survey March Supplement (March CPS) 1976–2016, males aged 26–64.
NBER dated recessions are shaded. Series are logged and detrended using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP)
filter with parameter 100.
Furthermore, I find that the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates
and undergraduates is significantly positive for workers with high tenure, but not for
new hires. Since workers’ job tenure is the generally used proxy for specific human
capital (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987), this phenomenon is consistent with a story of
specific capital: As experienced postgraduates have accumulated more specific human
capital in their jobs than their undergraduate degree-holding counterparts, the differ-
ence in their wage cyclicality is large. As new hires have not yet built any specific
capital, the difference in wage cyclicality is small. This may be due to the fact that
postgraduates often pursue complex and skilled jobs (Lindley and Machin, 2016), and
these jobs require more specific capital (Blatter, Muehlemann and Schenker, 2012).
I document a variety of stylized facts to make this argument: (1) the return to
the first year of tenure for postgraduates is higher than that for undergraduates; (2)
postgraduates who work in the same occupation and industry before and after their
job displacement have larger wage losses due to displacement than undergraduates (3)
postgraduate jobs require more specific human capital than undergraduate jobs; (4)
postgraduates jobs take longer to adapt to than undergraduate jobs. Together, these
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facts offer prima facie evidence that postgraduates accumulate more specific capital
in their jobs than undergraduates, and the type of specific capital that causes the
difference between postgraduates and undergraduates is more likely to be of firm-
specific nature.
My theory is that greater specific capital of postgraduates makes their outside
options less attractive. Postgraduates are less mobile, which allows them to get more
insurance from their employers.4 This theory is formalized in a directed search model
with risk averse workers and firm commitment in the spirit of Tsuyuhara (2016) and
Lamadon (2016).5 I augment it by adding specific capital accumulation and aggregate
shocks to productivity. The model has three important features. First, I assume
all new hires lack some specific human capital, which they obtain through a period
of adaptation. Second, I assume long-term contracts between risk-neutral firms and
risk-averse workers facing incomplete asset market. Because of the difference in risk
aversion, firms have a risk-sharing motive to provide insurance to their workers, and
thereby increase wage stability (Azariadis, 1975). Third, I assume job output depends
on worker effort, which is unobserved by firms.6 As workers might shirk their effort,
firms have to pay efficiency wages to incentivize their workers to exert optimal effort.
With this assumption, firms have an incentivizing motive to reduce wage stability.
The model produces three key results. First, experienced workers working in jobs
that require greater specific capital exert a higher effort and have a lower employment
separation rate. This is because the expected value of the worker’s outside options
is lower in these jobs. The second result is that, under the optimal contract, wage
changes track aggregate productivity shocks. When aggregate productivity increases,
firms promise a higher wage to incentivize their workers, and vice versa. Finally, the
third result is that, experienced workers working in jobs that require greater specific
4I show that there is less profit-sharing in postgraduate jobs, which is consistent with my theory.
5Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type search models typically assume continual Nash wage bar-
gaining between workers and firms, which would impose transmission of productivity shocks to wages
by construction, i.e. the insurance decision of firms is not endogenized. In addition, as workers are
usually risk-neutral in these models, they do not care about wage variation. Allowing risk-aversion
will make these models as complicated as mine.
6The effort decision is essential to generate wage variation in one-sided limited commitment models
(as in this paper). In a two-sided limited commitment model when neither the firm nor the worker
can commit to future pay, the optimal contract also calls for stable wages (Thomas and Worrall,
1988; Rudanko, 2009). Therefore, these models would have a similar prediction as mine. However,
using MCSUI Survey (Holzer et al., 2000), I find significant differences in the effort level between
postgraduates and undergraduates (see Appendix B.9.) My framework has direct implication on
worker effort and is able to generate results that are consistent with the empirical evidence.
4
capital have more stable wages. Firms face the trade-off between the risk-sharing
motive and the incentivizing motive. On the one hand, greater specific capital reduces
employment separation and thus increases the effectiveness of firms’ future promises
in motivating workers. On the other hand, under some mild regularity conditions,
greater specific capital increases firm’s marginal cost of providing incentives for worker
effort. As greater specific capital increases both the effectiveness and the marginal cost
of providing incentives, it becomes optimal for firms to provide more insurance rather
than more incentives.
I use my model to quantify the effect of specific capital on the educational gap in
labour turnover and real wage cyclicality. In the model, specific capital is determined
by 2 parameters: the upgrading probability from a new hire to an experienced worker
and the productivity gap between them. The upgrading probability is calculated based
on the time it takes for new hires to become fully productive. The productivity gap
is estimated by targeting the initial wage rise due to specific capital. The model is
parsimonious, and it can correctly generate the differences both in labour turnover
and in real wage cyclicality across education groups, given the observed empirical
differences in specific human capital. The model also shows that, as postgraduates
have to accumulate more specific capital, the cut in their starting wage on a new job
is larger, but their subsequent wage growth is faster.
Additionally, my paper implies that undergraduates receive less insurance within
firms than postgraduates, thereby, increasing the demand for social insurance among
this group. I conduct a counterfactual policy experiment to raise the unemployment
insurance (UI) by 20%. I find that this policy increases wage cyclicality, indicating
UI crowds out the implicit insurance provided by firms. However, the effect is less
pronounced for undergraduates than for postgraduates. Furthermore, the welfare gain
of undergraduates from such a policy is 85% higher than that of postgraduates, which
supports the argument for a lower UI replacement rate for postgraduates.
I also use my model to quantitatively evaluate two alternative explanations for the
counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. The two alternative explanations are
based on differences in job profitability and hiring costs. I re-estimate the model under
each of these alternative hypotheses and then use empirical evidence to discriminate
between them. Finally, I briefly discuss some alternatives not nested by my model:
cyclical changes in relative supply, differences in risk aversion, and different cyclical-
ity of shocks experienced by postgraduates and undergraduates. I compare them to
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the available empirical evidence and suggest that they can not provide a reasonable
explanation.
Related Literature
First, this paper contributes to the literature on insurance within the firm against aggre-
gate productivity shocks. In a competitive framework, Azariadis (1975) and Beaudry
and DiNardo (1991) argue that firms can provide employment contracts to insure work-
ers from aggregate shocks. Lustig, Syverson and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) study how
the portability of organizational capital by managers affects their compensation dynam-
ics. Lagakos and Ordonez (2011) study the role of displacement costs in determining
risk-sharing between workers and firms when neither party can commit to contracts.
To my knowledge, the current paper is the first to study within-firm insurance against
aggregate shocks in a noncompetitive framework when firms can commit to stay.
Second, this paper contributes to the theoretical literature on long-term contracts
in frictional labour markets. Burdett and Coles (2003) and Shi (2009) derive the
optimal wage-tenure contracts with risk averse workers. Menzio and Shi (2010) prove
the existence of a block recursive equilibrium in directed search models. Rudanko
(2009) derive the optimal contract with two-sided lack of commitment and aggregate
shocks but without unobserved worker behaviour. Tsuyuhara (2016), Lentz (2015),
and Lamadon (2016) introduce unobserved worker behaviour and dynamic incentive
contracts, but without shocks to aggregate productivity. The main contributions here
are to incorporate specific human capital and aggregate shocks, and to formally derive
the optimal wage contracts over the business cycle.
Finally, this paper contributes to the empirical literature that studies the cyclicality
of real wages across education groups.7 In the US, Bils (1985) and Solon, Barsky and
Parker (1994) find that estimated real wage cyclicality does not vary with the worker’s
years of education. Keane and Prasad (1993), Hoynes (2000), and Lindquist (2004) find
no significant educational gap in the cyclicality of real hourly wage.8 However, using
1967-1991 PSID, Swanson (2007) finds that wages of high school dropouts aged 20-29
exhibit greater pro-cyclicality than all other groups. In the UK, Blundell, Crawford
and Jin (2014) show that real hourly wages fell by about 10% for all education groups
7A large literature has studied earnings risk across other observables – see, e.g., Guvenen, Ozkan
and Song (2014) and Bloom et al. (2017) for some recent empirical evidence.
8However, Hoynes (2000) find that workers with more than a high school education is subject to
less cyclical variation in annual earnings than workers with a high school education and less.
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during the Great Recession. Delaney and Devereux (2019) study the UK compulsory
schooling laws and find that an additional year of education reduces the cyclicality of
the weekly pay of young men. Ammermueller, Kuckulenz and Zwick (2009) find the
opposite in Germany that workers with more years of education suffer higher cyclical
wage variation. In a related but different literature, Doniger (2019) documents that the
user cost of labour is more pro-cyclical for college graduates than noncollege workers.
In this paper, I compare workers at a higher education margin and provide novel
empirical evidence that postgraduates experience lower cyclical variation in real wages
than undergraduates. I then use a combination of microdata and a theoretical model
to quantitatively discriminate among several possible explanations for the observed
empirical patterns.
Outline
Section 2 provides empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the equilibrium search model.
Section 4 characterizes the optimal contract. In Section 5, I outline the estimation
strategy, discuss the identification, and report the estimation results. In Section 6, I
analyze the estimated model and report the counterfactual simulations. In Section 7, I
extend the model with on-the-job search. Section 8 evaluates the counterfactual policy.
Section 9 evaluates other potential explanations. Section 10 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
2.1 Wage Cyclicality by Education
First, I use individual-level data to estimate the effects of postgraduate degree on the
wage cyclicality, controlling for observed characteristics. I follow Keane and Prasad
(1993) and run the regression of log real hourly wage
ln Wit = θPGit + αUt + γPGit × Ut + Xitβ + εit (1)
where PGit is a postgraduate degree dummy, which equals 1 if the worker has a post-
graduate degree and 0 if he only has an undergraduate degree. Following the literature,
I use the unemployment rate Ut as a business cycle proxy.
9 α measures the cyclicality of
9Following Robin (2011), the unemployment rate is successively log-transformed, HP-filtered and
exponentiated. I HP-filter the annual series with a conventional smoothing parameter 100. I also
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the undergraduate wage. The coefficient γ on the interaction term PGit × Ut captures
the difference between the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage and the undergradu-
ate wage.10 Xit is a vector of observables including state dummies, a race dummy, a
marriage dummy, a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend.
I use data from the IPUMS-March CPS (Flood et al., 2018) for the 1976-2016
period.11 For sample selection, I broadly follow suggestions by Heathcote, Perri and
Violante (2010): I start by dropping observations with nonpositive weights or with
positive earnings but zero weeks worked. Next I eliminate observations who worked
less than 260 hours during the year. Those whose hourly wage was less than half the
legal minimum in that year are also excluded.12 Then I restrict the sample to males
aged 26-64 not self-employed. Finally, to focus on the effects of postgraduate degree, I
further restrict the sample to postgraduates and undergraduates only.
Empirical Results. Table 1 presents the estimates. The first column shows the re-
gression result on log real hourly wages. Hourly wages are computed as annual labour
earnings divided by annual hours, and are deflated to constant 2000 dollars. The esti-
mated coefficient α on the unemployment rate is -0.0124 (s.e. 0.0012), indicating that
a 1 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate causes a 1.24% decline in the real
wage for undergraduates. Thus, the undergraduate wage is strongly pro-cyclical. The
estimated coefficient γ on the interaction term PGit × Ut is 0.0086 (s.e. 0.0021), indi-
cating that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point in a downturn,
postgraduates face a 0.86% increase in their real wage relative to that of undergradu-
ates. Therefore, the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical. α+γ measures the
cyclicality of the postgraduate wage. The estimate is -0.0038 (s.e. 0.0017), indicating
that the postgraduate wage is less pro-cyclical than the undergraduate wage.13 Similar
detrend the unemployment rate using a cubic trend and obtain very similar estimates. See Appendix
B.3. In addition, I also experiment with other business cycle proxies, such as real GDP. See Appendix
B.1. The results are not affected by the choice of proxies.
10A negative estimate of α would imply that the average real wage of undergraduates is pro-cyclical.
A positive estimate of γ would indicate a counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium — the premium
increases when the unemployment rate rises.
11See Appendix A.1 for a description of the March CPS data.
12Only a small proportion of observations did not meet the criterion of half the legal minimum
wage: 0.49% of undergraduates and 0.5% of postgraduates. The regression result is robust when I
keep these observations, and the counter-cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium is the same as
the baseline. See Appendix B.3.
13In Appendix B.5, I plot the wage growth rates during booms and recessions, which are more stable
for postgraduates than those for undergraduates over the business cycle.
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results hold when both males and females are included in the sample (see Appendix
B.2.)
Table 1 also provide the regression results on annual hours and annual earnings,
which suggest that annual hours and annual earnings of postgraduates are both less
pro-cyclical than those of undergraduates. Appendix B.3 presents several robustness
checks. The results are robust when I use median regression, use a sample of private
sector workers, and regress by different age groups.
Table 1: Regression on Degree Interaction
OLS Fixed-Effects
Dependent lnWage lnHour lnEarnings lnWage
URATE (α) -.0124*** -.0064*** -.0188*** -.0124***
(.0012) (.0007) (.0015) (.0032)
PG × URATE (γ) .0086*** .0035*** .0121*** .0123**
(.0021) (.0011) (.0024) (.0062)
Include fixed effects Yes
α + γ -.0038** -.0029*** -.0067*** -.0002
(.0017) (.0009) (.0019) (.0053)
Observations 364,864 12,644
Data March CPS PSID
Notes. Sample is males aged 26–64 not self-employed. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Industries and Occupations. Below, in Section 9.3, I run the wage regression by
major industries and occupations. I show that this phenomenon occurs not because
postgraduates and undergraduates work in different industries and occupations that
are subject to different shocks. In addition, I run a series of regressions including
industry, as well as occupation fixed effects. I show that the different occupation and
industry composition of postgraduates and undergraduates can not fully explain the
result.
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Unemployment Risk. Another concern is that undergraduates are more likely to be
unemployed than postgraduates during recessions.14 Figure A.1 in Appendix B.4 plots
the Employment to Unemployment (EU) probabilities of postgraduates and undergrad-
uates using monthly CPS from 1979-2014. Both time series increase during recessions
and exhibit a counter-cyclical pattern of employment separation. To account for the
differences in unemployment risk, I run three regressions in Appendix B.4. First, I
control for the number of weeks unemployed and working part-time vs. full-time dur-
ing the prior year; Second, I restrict the sample to full-time workers who stayed in
the same job during the prior year; Third, I run Heckman (1979) selection model. All
three estimates only shrink slightly from the baseline, indicating that unemployment
risk is not driving the result.
Individual Fixed-Effects and Job Tenure. To control for unobserved heterogene-
ity, I run regression (1) with individual fixed-effects using the 1985–2015 Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID).15 The use of panel data avoids the problem of a changing
work force composition because the path of wages for individuals is used. It exploits
the changes in the interaction term PGi × Ut that vary with the unemployment rate
over time. I restrict the sample to male heads aged 26-64 not self-employed and con-
trol for a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend. The last column of Table 1 shows
that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point, postgraduates face
a 1.23% increase in their real wage relative to that of undergraduates.16
I further test whether this result is driven by the length of job tenure using the same
PSID sample.17 Specifically, I run the following fixed-effects regression of log wage on
14If this is the case, the average wage of undergraduates should increase mechanically relative to
that of postgraduates during recessions. This narrows the wage gap between postgraduates and under-
graduates, thereby reducing the counter-cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium. In addition,
the unemployment rates for both undergraduates and postgraduates are less than 3% (Table A.4 in
Appendix B.6), which illustrates the limited effect of selection bias.
15I use the data after 1985 for the following three reasons: (1) the variable for the highest degree
received is only available since 1985; (2) although the variable for the years of education is available
since 1968, it was only in 1975 and 1985 that the education of the existing heads of household was
re-asked; (3) in my sample, almost no one has more than 16 years of education before 1983, which is
not useful for the analysis of postgraduates. See Appendix A.3 for a description of the PSID data.
16In fact, the fixed-effects estimate of the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium (γ) is larger
than the OLS estimate, indicating that the OLS estimate provides a lower bound: as low-skill workers
are more likely to be unemployed during recessions, the average quality of employed undergraduates
increase mechanically relative to that of employed postgraduates. As the difference in average quality
between postgraduates and undergraduates decreases in recessions, the postgraduate wage premium
decreases, thus imposing a procyclical bias to the OLS estimate.
17PSID is particularly advantageous here because of the information it provides on the length of
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interactions between Ut, PGit and length of tenure
ln Wit = LowTenureit × (α1Ut + γ1PGi × Ut) (2)
+ (1 − LowTenureit) × (α2Ut + γ2PGi × Ut) + Xitβ + µi + εit
where LowTenureit is a dummy on the length of tenure, which equals 1 if the worker
has at most κ years of uninterrupted tenure on the current job and equals 0 if he has
higher tenure. µi stands for unobserved individual-specific characteristics that are fixed
over time. γ1 measures the difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and
undergraduates for new hires, and γ2 measures that for workers with high tenure.
Table 2: Fixed-effects Regressions by Job Tenure
lnWage κ = 1.5 κ = 2 κ = 2.5
LowTenure
URATE (α1) -.0160** -.0143** -.0153**
(.0075) (.0065) (.0062)
PG × URATE (γ1) .0053 .0063 .0056
(.0068) (.0066) (.0066)
1 − LowTenure
URATE (α2) -.0120*** -.0125*** -.0124***
(.0035) (.0035) (.0036)
PG × URATE (γ2) .0115* .0118* .0123**
(.0062) (.0062) (.0062)




Source. PSID 1985-2015, males heads, aged 26–64, not self-employed. “κ = 1.5”: LowTenure is set
as, at most, 1.5 years of tenure. “κ = 2”: LowTenure is set as, at most, 2 years of tenure. “κ = 2.5”:
LowTenure is set as, at most, 2.5 years of tenure. Controls: a cubic age trend and a quartic time
trend. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
I first set LowTenure as, at most, 1.5 years of tenure. The estimates are presented
in the Column “κ = 1.5” of Table 2. For new hires, the estimated coefficient γ1 has
the positive sign but is not significant. For workers with high tenure, the estimated
uninterrupted tenure on the current job. Regarding the job tenure supplement to the CPS, since
individuals are only observed once in the supplement, individual fixed-effects can not be controlled
for.
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coefficient γ2 is significantly positive, indicating that postgraduates have smaller wage
cyclicality than undergraduates. γ2 is significantly larger than γ1 indicates that the
difference in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates rises with job
tenure. Then, in the Column “κ = 2” and κ = 2.5”, I set LowTenure as at most 2
years and 2.5 years of tenure respectively. The results are similar.
A worker’s job tenure is the generally used proxy for specific human capital (Altonji
and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991). Thus, this phenomenon is consistent with a story
of specific capital: As new hires have not yet built any specific capital, the difference
in wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates is small. As experi-
enced postgraduates have accumulated more specific human capital in their jobs than
experienced undergraduates, the difference in their wage cyclicality is large.
2.2 Specific Capital by Education
In the previous section, I showed that the postgraduate wage is less pro-cyclical than
the undergraduate wage, and the difference in wage cyclicality rises with job tenure.
My theory for this phenomenon is that postgraduates accumulate more specific capital
in their jobs than undergraduates, which reduces their wage cyclicality. I establish
the following stylized facts to make this argument: (1) the return to the first year
of tenure for postgraduates is higher than that for undergraduates; (2) postgraduates
who work in the same occupation and industry before and after their job displacement
have larger wage losses due to displacement than undergraduates; (3) postgraduate
jobs require more specific human capital than undergraduate jobs; (4) postgraduates
jobs take longer to adapt to than undergraduate jobs.
Return to Tenure. In the literature on the returns to specific human capital ac-
cumulation, a larger wage rise as job tenure accumulates is consistent with a greater
specific capital gap between new and experienced workers. I estimate the return to
tenure using the same PSID sample as above. To distinguish separate returns to gen-
eral experience and specific capital, I adopt the two-stage estimator proposed by Topel
(1991). The basic idea is that within-job wage growth combines the returns to general
experience and specific capital. The first stage estimates the determinants of wage
growth but is unable to distinguish separate returns to general experience and specific
capital. The second stage is a cross-sectional comparison of initial wages on new jobs,
which yields the returns to general experience alone. In combination with estimates
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from the first stage, this translates to the returns to specific capital. I describe the
details of this procedure in Appendix B.7. The first row of Table 3 shows that the
return to the first year of tenure for postgraduates (0.077) is higher than that for un-
dergraduates (0.056). The difference is 0.021, which is significant at the 10 percent
level.
Table 3: Measures of Specific Capital by Education
Postgrad. Undergrad. Diff.
(1) Return to the first year of tenure .077 .056 .021*
(.010) (.007) (.012)
(2) Displacement cost (occupation and industry stayers) -.329 -.153 -.176**
(.068) (.045) (.079)
(3) Necessity of specific capital 3.221 3.011 .210**
(.080) (.043) (.092)
(4) Adaptation period (weeks) 55 28 26***
(4.9) (2.6) (5.6)
30 years and over 56 28 28***
(6.0) (3.7) (7.0)
45 years and over 49 23 26**
(8.0) (5.1) (9.7)
Source. Row (1) uses data from PSID 1985-2015; Row (2) uses data from DWS 1994-2016; Other rows
use data from MCSUI 1992-1994. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Displacement Cost. More specific capital also leads to larger displacement costs, as
measured by wage losses due to job displacement. I examine this implication using the
1994-2016 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS), which identifies workers displaced due to
exogenous reasons (and not recalled).18 I also use industry and occupation switchers
to reveal the source of specific capital. Specifically, I run the following regression
DCit = α1PGi + α2Occ Switcheri + α3PGi × Occ Switcheri
+ α4Ind Switcheri + α5PGi × Ind Switcheri + φt + εit (3)
where DCit is the displacement costs of individual i as measured by log difference in
real weekly wages between pre- and postdisplacement jobs, i.e. (log postdisplacement
18In DWS, some displaced workers might be recalled to their old jobs. Ever since the 1994 survey,
respondents were asked, “Do you expect to be recalled to that job [that you lost]?” See Appendix A.2
for a description of the DWS data.
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wage) − (log predisplacement wage). Occ Switcheri is a dummy variable that indicates
whether individual i changed occupations across jobs. Ind Switcheri indicates whether
the individual changed industries across jobs. Year fixed effects are captured by φt.
I construct a sample of males who were involuntarily displaced from a full-time job
within the previous three years and who were reemployed in a full-time job at the time
of their interview. I also exclude self-employed workers and those who expected to be
recalled to their displaced jobs. Occupation and industry switchers are identified using
the 3-digit industry and occupation codes from the CPS.
Table 4: Displacement Cost




Occ Switcher -.1900*** -.2004***
(.0606) (.0625)
PG × Occ Switcher .0968 .1128
(.0896) (.0898)
Ind Switcher -.1232*** -.1318***
(.0305) (.0276)
PG × Ind Switcher .1442 .1638
(.1061) (.1000)
Observations 2,936 2,936
Time FE Yes Yes
Demographic Controls No Yes
Source. DWS 1994-2016. Demographic controls: years since displacement, age, age squared, and an
indicator for non-white. Robust standard errors clustered by year are reported in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Column (1) of Table 4 reports estimates of Regression (3). The coefficient on
Occ Switcheri is negative and highly significant, while the coefficient on the interac-
tion PGi × Occ Switcheri is not significant. This implies that switching occupations
goes along with a large wage loss, but there is no difference in this cost between post-
graduates and undergraduates. Similar results apply to the cost of switching industries.
Occ Switcheri has a larger effect (is more negative) than Ind Switcheri, which con-
firms that switching occupations is more costly than switching industries (Kambourov
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and Manovskii, 2009). The coefficient on the postgraduate degree dummy PGi is neg-
ative and significant at the 5% level. This implies that for occupation and industry
stayers,19 postgraduates have larger displacement costs than undergraduates. Row (2)
of Table 3 shows the predicted value for postgraduates and undergraduates respec-
tively. Column (2) adds additional controls and shows that the relationship between
postgraduate degrees and displacement costs remains robust after controlling for indi-
vidual characteristics. Therefore, although the occupation-specific and the industry-
specific human capital leads to large displacement costs, the type of specific capital
that contributes to the difference between postgraduates and undergraduates is more
likely to be of firm-specific nature.
Necessity of Specific Capital. Next I show that, compared with undergraduate
jobs, postgraduate jobs require more specific capital. I use a US employer survey, the
1992-1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI).20 One important aspect
of the survey was the contacting of employers in four large US cities (Los Angeles,
Boston, Detroit and Atlanta) to ask detailed questions about the last new employee
the company hired. One of these questions reads “How necessary is specific experience
directly related to this job?” It is measured on a scale from 1 to 4. A higher score
indicates that the job requires more specific capital.21 I regress this variable on a
postgraduate degree dummy and demographic controls. I use the regression coefficients
reported in Appendix B.8 to calculate the predicted value for postgraduate jobs and
undergraduate jobs respectively. Row (3) of Table 3 shows that the necessity of specific
capital for postgraduate jobs (3.2) is higher than that for undergraduate jobs (3). The
difference is significant at the 5 percent level.
Adaptation Period. If a job requires more specific capital, it takes longer to adapt
to (Hudomiet, 2015). The MCSUI Survey also shows that there is a considerable
difference between postgraduate jobs and undergraduate jobs in terms of the adaptation
period for new hires. Each employer answers how many weeks it takes the typical
employee in this position to become fully competent in it. Row (4) of Table 3 shows
that a newly hired postgraduate needs 55 weeks, which is about twice the time needed
19Occupation and industry stayers are workers who report their predisplacement and current jobs
have the same occupation and industry.
20See Appendix A.4 for a description of the MCSUI Survey. The survey was conducted in the
middle of the time period with which this paper is concerned.
21The original question was reverse coded. I recoded this variable to avoid misunderstandings.
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for a newly hired undergraduate. The appropriate theoretical concept of specificity
here is not whether a worker can use the skills he has learned in another firm, but
whether a worker can be as productive in a new job as an experienced worker. If this
measure were capturing primarily general human capital, one would expect to observe
in the data that the adaptation period declines rapidly with rising age of workers.
However, The last two rows of Table 3 shows that it remains important also for older
workers. This suggests that this measure contains primarily specific human capital.
The objective of this paper is to study whether the observed differences in measures
of specific capital are able to quantitatively explain the observed differences in wage
cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates. My theory is that greater spe-
cific capital of postgraduates allows them to get more insurance from their employers.
Appendix B.9 presents the proportion of jobs that is profit-sharing by education. It
shows that there is less profit-sharing in postgraduate jobs, which is consistent with
my theory.
3 Contracting Model of Asymmetric Information
In this section, I develop an equilibrium search model with dynamic incentive contracts,
imperfect monitoring of worker effort, and aggregate shocks. I use it to evaluate the
impact of specific capital on labour turnover and wage cyclicality. I assume risk-averse
workers and risk-neutral firms, which make long-term contracts optimal.22 Imperfect
monitoring creates a moral hazard problem that requires firms to pay efficiency wages.
Greater specific capital leads to lower mobility, thereby alleviating the moral hazard and
improving risk-sharing. Job search is directed, and the equilibrium is block-recursive,
such that individuals’ optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the
distribution of workers.
3.1 Preferences and Technology
Time is discrete and indexed by t. Workers have different levels of education. Workers
in each education group possess a certain amount of general human capital h. Let s ∈
{0, 1} indicate whether a worker is an experienced worker (s = 1) or a new hire (s = 0).
New hires are less productive than experienced workers. The productivity gap between
22This assumption is based on the arguments that entrepreneurs are less risk-averse than workers,
and their risk can be insured through better access to asset markets.
16
new and experienced workers τh is equal to the amount of specific capital required for
the job. Consistent with the empirical evidence presented in the previous section, I
assume that specific capital accumulation is exogenous. It reflects how complex the
jobs are, and how difficult it is to gain full productivity in them. In each period, a new
hire may upgrade to an experienced worker with probability φh. Then 1/φh yields the
average duration of adaptation. Note that φh and τh depend on the education level h.
Aggregate productivity zt evolves as a first-order Markov chain with transition
probabilities π (zt+1|zt), such that the transition matrix Π is monotone. I follow the
standard approach in the search literature by assuming that a firm is a single-worker
production unit. In aggregate state z, a match between a firm and a worker of education
h produces




yh (1, z) = zh if s = 1




if s = 0
which is strictly increasing in the level of education h, aggregate shock z, and specific
capital s.
Workers are risk-averse. They are endowed with one unit of labour each period,
which they supply to firms for a wage wt. Workers cannot save or borrow against their
future income.23 A worker’s consumption each period equals his wage if employed, or
equals bh if unemployed.
Following Tsuyuhara (2016), I assume a job consists of a series of projects, one of
which is executed in each period. Employed workers exert effort et for a project of
the firm during each period. With probability r (et), the project succeeds, and the
output is yh (s, z). With probability 1 − r (et), the project fails, and the output is 0.
If the project succeeds, the job continues in the following period, whereas the worker
is laid off and becomes unemployed if the project fails. The probability of success r (.)
is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and concave function. The




βt [u (wt) − c (et)]
The utility of consumption u (.) is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increas-
ing, and strictly concave function. The effort cost function c (.) is a twice continuously
23A search model combing saving and long-term contracts is very complicated in a business cycle
setting, because it requires firms to post jobs depending on workers’ wealth. I leave this to future
research.
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differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex function, and satisfies standard Inada
conditions so that effort is interior.
3.2 Employment Contracts
At the beginning of each match, a risk-neutral firm offers a long-term contract to
a risk-averse worker. The contract specifies wages and recommended effort for all
continuation histories. Let xt = (st, zt) be the state of the match at period t. History












where wt is the wage and et is the recommended effort. I assume firms commit to
contract σ and that, once the employment relationship begins, the firm cannot adjust
the prespecified sequences of wages and effort.
The optimal contract depends crucially on the observability of the effort level.
If effort were observable, because of the difference in risk aversion between firms and
workers, the problem would be purely one of efficient risk-sharing. Firms would provide
insurance to workers by equating marginal utilities across realizations of aggregate
shocks. They would offer constant wages and prescribe constant effort (Azariadis,
1975). I assume the level of effort et is unobserved by firms. As cost of effort enters
negatively in his utility function, the worker might shirk his effort. Then, firms have
to adjust wages to provide incentives. Thus, the moral hazard problem requires firms
to pay efficiency wages.
3.3 Worker Effort Choice Problem
Following the recursive contracting approach in Spear and Srivastava (1987), history de-
pendence can be summarized by introducing an additional state variable, the promised
value V , which is the expected discounted future value that the firm promised to de-












is the value promised to the worker
for each realization of aggregate state z′ and specific capital s′ next period, and e is
the recommended effort level.
An employed worker optimally chooses effort e prescribed by the contract. Let Uhz
be the value of unemployment for a worker of education level h at aggregate state z.
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The incentive-compatibility constraint for a worker of education h and specific capital
s at aggregate state z is
e ∈ argmax
ê



























if s = 0
Here φh is the upgrading probability from a new hire to an experienced worker. Then












Intuitively, effort is chosen to equate the marginal cost of effort with its marginal
benefit. According to this equation, there is little hope to separately identify the
convexity of c (.) and the concavity of r (.). Therefore, I normalize the probability of









and Nicolini (1997) have a similar setup with convex cost function of job search effort
and concave job finding probability. They normalize the cost function of job search
effort to be linear and estimate the concavity of the job finding probability.
As effort cost function c (.) is strictly increasing and strictly convex, e increases
with the expected promised value next period EszV
h
s′z′ and decreases with the expected
value of unemployment next period EzU
h
z′ . By promising a higher value next period,
the firm can extract a higher effort in the current period.
3.4 Firm Contracting Problem
I now describe the firm problem in terms of promised value. Consider the situation
faced by a firm that is matched with a worker with specific capital s and education
h. Let Πh (s, z, V ) be the expected discounted profit for the firm when the aggregate
state is z and the worker is offered with a continuation value V . If the match separates,
the firm is left with zero profit. Then Πh (s, z, V ) must satisfy the following Bellman
equation:
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e · yh (s, z) − w + e · βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
(6)













1, z′, V h1z′
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0, z′, V h0z′
)]
if s = 0
subject to the promise-keeping constraint and the incentive-compatibility constraint


















The promise-keeping constraint (7) requires that the firm delivers the promised
value V to the worker. By increasing future promises, the firm can increase the effort
level of its worker, and thus, increase the probability that the match continues.24
3.5 Search Markets and Equilibrium
The meeting process between unemployed workers and vacancies is constrained by
search frictions. The labour market is organized in a set of queues indexed by vht ,
which is the value promised to workers in that given queue. vht equals the expected
lifetime utility for a worker of education h who matches with a firm in this submarket.
Each firm chooses in which queue they want to open a vacancy with a flow cost
ηh > 0, and each unemployed worker chooses where to queue. Each sub-market is




, which is the ratio of the number
of vacancies to the number of unemployed workers in this sub-market. The tightness
captures the fact that a high ratio of vacancies to workers will make it harder for firms
to hire. In a directed search model like the one presented here, the tightness is queue
24Note that promise-keeping and incentive-compatibility restrictions may define a set that is not
convex. Then the profit function may not be concave. In this case, the solution to the dynamic
programming problem above can be improved by using lotteries (Phelan and Townsend, 1991). How-
ever, as is argued by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), the optimal contract may not involve the use of
lotteries, because convexity of the choice set is a sufficient but not necessary condition for concavity
of the profit function. Indeed, in all my numerical computations, the profit function turns out to
be concave, making lotteries redundant. Since the objective of this section is to derive some general
properties of the optimal contracts, I will focus on the optimal program defined above, disregarding
the use of lotteries.
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specific. I use a standard matching function that in the sub-market with tightness θ, a
vacancy is filled with probability q (θ) = θα−1, and a worker matches with probability
µ (θ) = θα.25 Then
µ (θ) = q (θ)
α
α−1 (10)
In principle, different sub-markets could co-exist at the same time, but this does not
happen in equilibrium. Anticipating such an outcome, the equilibrium definition spec-









each aggregate productivity z and education level h.26
A competitive search equilibrium is defined along the lines of Moen (1997).
Definition 1. A competitive search equilibrium consists of: for each (z, h), a value







0z′ , such that
1. Search offers zero profit for a firm, i.e. the free entry condition equalizes the costs










0, z′, V h0z′
)
− ηh = 0 (11)






is the probability of filling
a vacancy. As the worker is initially unskilled, EzΠ
h
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)
is the firm’s
expected profit when matched with a new hire in the beginning of the match.
2. No Pareto improving sub-market is possible, i.e. there does not exist a sub-market
25From the relationship between the probabilities of finding a job and filling a vacancy (Equation

























Then, vacancy posting cost ηh and α are not separately identified. Therefore, I draw from the evidence
reported in Shimer (2005) and accordingly set α = 0.28.
26For any sub-market that provides a high value to workers through high wages, the market tightness
must be low for firms to break even. The low market tightness leads to low job-finding probability.
The congestion externalities implies that as wages rise, the declining job-finding probability eventually
dominates the rising promised value, and a unique optimal level of promised value balances these
effects. Uniqueness occurs for the same reasons as in Moen (1997) and Rudanko (2009), with the
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> ηh (13)


























4 Characterization of the Optimal Contract
Lemma 1. The pareto frontier Πh (s, z, V ) increases with the level of aggregate pro-
ductivity z and specific capital s.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Lemma 2. The expected value of the worker’s outside options is lower in jobs that
require greater specific capital (a lower upgrading probability and/or a higher initial
productivity gap).
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
The intuition for this result is that a lower upgrading probability φ and/or a higher
initial productivity gap τ reduce the expected value of a new job, leading to a decrease
in the job finding rate in every sub-market, thereby reducing the expected value of the
worker’s outside options.
Proposition 1. Experienced workers working in jobs that require greater specific capital
exert a higher effort and have a lower probability of employment separation.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that, in leaving their current jobs, experienced
workers have to build up specific human capital again, so they have strong incentives
to keep their jobs longer. These incentives are stronger in jobs that require greater
specific capital, as the value of the worker’s outside options is lower in these jobs.
Thus, greater specific capital increases an experienced worker’s optimal effort. Then
their projects are more likely to succeed and their jobs are less likely to break down.
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Proposition 2. Under the optimal contract, wage changes track aggregate productivity
shocks.
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that, when aggregate productivity increases,
firms promise a higher wage next period to incentivize their workers to make a greater
effort, and vice versa if aggregate productivity decreases.
Next, I show that wage stability is affected by the level of specific capital, given
that firms face the trade-off between increasing wage stability to provide insurance to
workers (risk-sharing motive) and increasing wage variation to incentivize their workers
to exert the optimal effort (incentivizing motive).
Assumption 1. The marginal cost of effort is convex.
This assumption is an additional convexity requirement on the effort cost function,
which is the sufficient condition for the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given Assumption 1, experienced workers working in jobs that require
greater specific capital have more stable wages.
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
Firms face the trade-off between the risk-sharing motive and the incentivizing mo-
tive. On the one hand, as experienced workers working in jobs that require greater
specific capital have a lower probability of employment separation, they will value more
about firms’ future promises, i.e. firms’ promises become more effective in motivat-
ing workers. On the other hand, Assumption 1 indicates that providing incentives for
worker effort becomes increasingly costly as effort level increases. Greater specific capi-
tal increases an experienced worker’s effort level, thereby increasing the firm’s marginal
cost of providing incentives. In sum, as greater specific capital increases both the ef-
fectiveness and the marginal cost of providing incentives, it becomes optimal for firms
to provide more insurance to workers rather than more incentives.
5 Estimation
To quantify the effect of specific capital on the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage
premium, I estimate the model with two education groups: undergraduates (BA) and
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postgraduates (PG).27 Some of the model parameters are fixed at externally estimated
values, while others are directly estimated. I begin by describing the fixed and exter-
nally estimated parameters and then turn to the directly estimated parameters.
5.1 Fixed and Externally Estimated Parameters
The parameter values that are fixed and externally estimated are listed in Table 5.
The upgrading probability from a new hire to an experienced worker φ is calculated
using MCSUI Survey as the inverse of the adaptation period (Table 3).28 A period in
the model is 1 month. The discount factor is consistent with an annual real interest
rate of 5%, which is the long term average of the 3-month Treasury Bill in 1976-2016.
I normalize the amount of general skills of undergraduates hBA = 1.
Table 5: Exogenous Parameter Values
Description Param. Value Source
discount factor β .996 3-month Treasury Bill
general skills of undergraduates hBA 1 Normalization
upgrading probability of a new hire
postgraduates φP G .07 MCSUI Survey
undergraduates φBA .14 MCSUI Survey
5.2 Model Specification
Given the parameters above, I estimate the model using a parametrized model. I





The aggregate productivity follows an AR(1) in logs, such that





27I also estimate a version of the model with three education groups: noncollege workers, undergrad-
uates, and postgraduates. The estimates show that the model can correctly capture the differences in
wage cyclicality across these three education groups, given the observed differences in specific capital.
See Appendix D.
28Weeks are transformed to months by multiplying 4.
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The worker’s effort cost function is
c (e) = c0
[
(1 − e)−c1 − 1
]
(16)
such that c (0) = 0, lim
e→1
c (e) = ∞, c′ (.) > 0, c′′ (.) > 0, c′′′ (.) > 0.29 I assume the
vacancy posting cost and the flow payment while unemployed are proportional to the
amount of general skills to rule out different profitability (Pissarides, 2000)
ηh = η ∗ h (17)
bh = b ∗ h (18)
I relax these proportionality assumptions in Section 9.
These specifications leave me with the following 10 parameters to estimate:
{ρz, σz, η, b, c0, c1, γ, τP G, τBA, hP G}
I perform my estimations using the simulated method of moments. The objective
function is minimized over all parameters. The initial productivity gap between new
hires and experienced workers determines the size of specific capital in the model. To
pin down τBA and τP G, I target the return to the first year of tenure in the data (Table
3). The parameters of the aggregate productivity shock {ρz, σz} are identified by the
standard deviation and auto-correlation of log GDP. The amount of general skills of
postgraduates hP G is pinned down by the median postgraduate wage premium. The
vacancy cost η affects the meeting rate through firm’s free entry condition (11). The
flow payment while unemployed b affects the value of unemployment, and thus, affects
the probabilities of starting a job, since individuals without jobs will choose where to
apply based on present value. Thus, job finding probabilities by education pin down
η and b. The parameters of the effort cost function c0 and c1 affect the average rate
at which workers lose their jobs. They are pinned down by employment separation
rates by education. As GDP is only provided on a quarterly frequency, I take the
quarterly average for all monthly series. Then, I log and HP filter the data with
smoothing parameter 105 to produce business cycle statistics.30 The parameter of risk
29c′ (e) = c0c1 (1 − e)
−c1−1 , c′ (0) = c0c1, lim
e→1
c′ (e) = ∞. To deal with the corner solutions, I set
effort to 0 if c′ (0) < c0c1, and effort can never be 1 as the cost is infinite.
30The smoothing parameter is suggested by Shimer (2005).
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aversion γ controls how quickly changes in aggregate productivity are transmitted into
wage changes. I target it at the elasticity of median wages with respect to GDP for
undergraduates. Please note that the elasticity of median wages for postgraduates is
not targeted. I leave it as a model outcome and show that the model is successfully
able to match the non-targeted moment.
5.3 Estimation Results
Estimation is performed using the simulated method of moments. The computation of
standard errors is based on the pseudo-likelihood estimator presented in Chernozhukov
and Hong (2003). Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) rejection sampling, I
can perform the estimation without having to compute derivatives and still obtain
standard errors on the parameters.
Table 6: Parameter Estimates
Parameters Value s.e.
Persistence of aggregate productivity ρz .988 .006
Std. of shock to aggregate productivity σz .004 .002
Vacancy posting cost η .910 .496
Flow payment while unemployed b .236 .134
Level of effort cost c0 .363 .132
Curvature of effort cost c1 .095 .057
Risk aversion γ 1.136 .240
General skills of postgraduates hP G 1.239 .061
Initial productivity gap
Postgraduate τP G .610 .074
Undergraduate τBA .302 .071
The parameter estimates are displayed in Table 6. The flow payment while un-
employed b is 0.236, which is slightly higher than the estimate in Chodorow-reich and
Karabarbounis (2016), but is lower than that in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). The
initial productivity gap for undergraduates is 0.302, which is about half of that for
postgraduates. In addition, the amount of general human capital of postgraduates is
23% higher than that of undergraduates. The fitted moments in the data and their
model simulations are shown in Table 7. The model fits the moments well. One
success of the model is that it can capture the turnover rates between postgraduates
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Table 7: Model Fit (Targeted Moments)
Moments Data Model
Postgraduates
Employment separation rate .005 .004
Job finding rate .244 .243
Return to the first year of tenure .077 .075
Undergraduates
Employment separation rate .007 .008
Job finding rate .258 .261
Return to the first year of tenure .056 .056
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .581 .582
Common moments
Median postgraduate wage premium 1.23 1.23
std [GDP ] .024 .023
autocorr [GDP ] .954 .971
and undergraduates: undergraduates have higher probabilities both in job finding and
employment separation compared to postgraduates, and the relative differences are
generally accurate.
6 Analysis
Cyclical Properties of Wages. The upper panel of Table 8 shows the wage cycli-
cality in the data and their model simulations. Please note only the cyclicality of the
undergraduate wage is targeted in the estimation; the cyclicality of the postgraduate
wage and wage premium are not targeted. In the model simulation, the elasticity of
the median postgraduate wage and postgraduate wage premium w.r.t. GDP are 0.367
and -0.215 respectively, which are about the same size as the data. Figure 2 plots the
detrended GDP and wages simulated from the model. The dotted line is the GDP, the
solid line is the postgraduate wage, and the dashed line is the undergraduate wage. It
shows that both the postgraduate wage and the undergraduate wage are pro-cyclical,
but the postgraduate wage fluctuates less than the undergraduate wage. Therefore,
the model picks up the fact that the postgraduate wage is more stable than the un-
dergraduate wage over the business cycle, and thus, the postgraduate wage premium
is counter-cyclical.
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Furthermore, I split the sample into high tenure (greater than 1.5 years of tenure)
and low tenure (less than 1.5 years of tenure) and compare wage elasticity using wages
simulated by the model. For workers with low tenure, the elasticity of median wage
w.r.t. GDP for undergraduates (0.168) is similar to that for postgraduates (0.16). For
workers with high tenure, the elasticity of median wage for undergraduates (0.633) is
much higher than that for postgraduates (0.428). Therefore, the difference in wage
cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates is driven by workers with high
tenure, which is consistent with the findings in Table 2.
Table 8: Non-targeted Moments in the Estimation
Moments Type Data Model
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP
Postgraduates Non-targeted .342 .367
Undergraduates Targeted .581 .582
Postgraduate wage premium Non-targeted -.239 -.215
Wage loss due to job displacement
Postgraduates Non-targeted -.329 -.322
Undergraduates Non-targeted -.153 -.171
Cyclicality of employment separation rate
Postgraduates Non-targeted -.081 -.060
Undergraduates Non-targeted -.122 -.129
Notes. Non-targeted moments are not used in the estimation. Cyclicality of employment separation
rate is calculated as the correlation between employment separation rate and labour productivity
(BLS series PRS85006163 “output per job in the nonfarm business sector”).
Displacement Costs. Different levels of specific capital also have different impli-
cations for displacement costs, as measured by wage losses due to job displacement.
The middle panel of Table 8 shows the displacement costs derived from DWS data and
their model simulations. Although these moments are not targeted in the estimation,
their values in the data and in the model are about the same size. It confirms that
the displacement costs of postgraduates are larger than those of undergraduates. In
combination with the fact that the return to tenure of postgraduates is higher, it can
be seen that since postgraduates have to accumulate more specific capital, the cut in
their starting wage on a new job is larger, but their subsequent wage growth is faster.
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Figure 2: Detrended GDP and Wages by Education
Cyclicality of employment separation rate. As an additional out-of-sample test
of the fit of the model, the lower panel of Table 8 shows the correlation between
employment separation rate and labour productivity. Both of the separation rates are
negatively correlated with labour productivity, and the magnitude is slightly stronger
for undergraduates. The model fits the overall magnitudes relatively well.
6.1 Impact of Specific Capital on Wage Cyclicality and Labour
Turnover
To examine the importance of specific capital on labour turnover and wage cyclicality,
I run a counterfactual simulation where postgraduate jobs require the same low level
of specific capital as undergraduate jobs: the upgrading probability φ is increased from
0.07 to 0.14, and the initial productivity gap τ is reduced from 0.610 to 0.302. I report
the simulation results in the column “Low Capital” of Table 9.
The first row of column “Low Capital” shows that, when postgraduate jobs require
lower specific capital, the employment separation rate increases from 0.004 to 0.007.
As there is less to lose if they move to a new job, they exert a lower effort for their
projects, and their jobs are more likely to break down. An increase in the upgrading
probability and a decrease in the initial productivity gap increase the value of a new
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Table 9: Low Level of Specific Capital for Postgraduate Jobs
Moments Baseline Low Capital
Postgraduates
(1) Employment separation rate .004 .007
(2) Job finding rate .243 .259
(3) Return to the first year of tenure .075 .063
(4) Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .367 .552
Undergraduates
(5) Employment separation rate .008 .008
(6) Job finding rate .261 .261
(7) Return to the first year of tenure .056 .056
(8) Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .582 .582
Postgraduate wage premium
(9) Median 1.23 1.24
(10) Elasticity w.r.t. GDP -.215 -.030
Note. Baseline: baseline calibration; Low Capital: Postgraduate jobs require the same low level of
specific capital as undergraduate jobs.
job. Consequently, firms have a greater incentive to post vacancies. In the second
row of “Low Capital”, the job finding rate of the postgraduates increases from 0.243
to 0.259. Hence, when holding the same level of specific capital, postgraduates and
undergraduates have the similar level of labour market turnover rates.
The 4th row of “Low Capital” shows that when postgraduates have lower specific
capital, the wage elasticity w.r.t. GDP increases from 0.367 to 0.552, indicating that,
relative to the baseline simulation, the postgraduate wage fluctuates more over the
business cycle and is as cyclical as the undergraduate wage. In the last row of “Low
Capital”, the elasticity of postgraduate wage premium to GDP changes from -0.215 to
-0.030, i.e. the postgraduate wage premium changes from counter-cyclical to acyclical.
So once holding the level of specific capital equal, the model generates similar wage
cyclicality across education groups. This result shows that specific capital can explain
the difference in the wage cyclicality between postgraduates and undergraduates.
Figure 3 compares log median wages across education groups and specific capital
levels. The solid line is the log median wage of postgraduates in the baseline simula-
tion, the dashed line is that of postgraduates in the “Low Capital” simulation, and the
dotted line is that of undergraduates in the baseline. First, in comparing educations
levels, postgraduate wages are higher than undergraduate wages. When I compare
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Figure 3: Effect of Specific Capital on Wage Cyclicality
within postgraduate wages, the postgraduate wage in the baseline is more stable than
that in the “Low Capital” simulation, which is also the result of Proposition 3. The
postgraduate wage in the “Low Capital” simulation fluctuates as much as the under-
graduate wage in the baseline.
Interestingly, in the 9th row of Table 9, the postgraduate wage premium increases
slightly from 1.23 in the baseline to 1.24 in the “Low Capital” simulation, i.e. a lower
level of specific capital shifts the postgraduate wage premium up. As postgraduates
have more specific capital than undergraduates, they accept relatively lower wages in
exchange for greater wage stability.
7 On-the-job Search
Prior literature has showed that on-the-job search is an important component regarding
worker mobility. Here I include it in the model and explore how the possibility of on-
the-job search would affect the results.
Worker On-the-job Search Problem. Each period, an employed worker of educa-







, where κ ∈ [0, 1] denotes his on-the-job search efficiency.
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If matched he moves to a new job and the current job is destroyed. If the worker does
not match, the current job persists. Therefore, the worker chooses vhEt to maximize the
expected value of search. Let the aggregate state be z. Then the employed worker’s














Worker Effort Choice Problem. Consider an employed worker with specific capi-
tal s and education h. Let the worker be employed in a job offering continuation value
V and his optimal search decision be vhEz. The worker faces the following problem























Firm Contracting Problem. The expected profit can be expressed recursively as
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subject to the promise-keeping constraint and the incentive-compatibility constraint


































Estimation The additional parameter to estimate is the on-the-job search efficiency
κ. I use job-to-job transition rates to pin down this parameter. The fitted moments are
shown in the Table 11. I use the same estimation strategy as the baseline, that is, not
targeting the elasticity of median postgraduate wage w.r.t. GDP. Overall, the model
correctly captures the magnitudes and the relative difference in wage cyclicality. The
parameter estimates are displayed in Table 10. Compared to the case of no on-the-job
search, the estimates of the initial productivity gap drop from 0.61 to 0.5 for postgrad-
uates and from 0.3 to 0.22 for undergraduates. This is because the initial productivity
gap is pinned down by the return to the first year of tenure in the estimation. With
on-the-job search, an employee may move to another firm after a successful search. The
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firm must provide a faster-growing wage profile to increase the probability of retaining
the employee. Other things being equal, the return to the first year of tenure tends
to be larger, and thus, the estimates of initial productivity gap become smaller in the
on-the-job search case.
8 Policy Evaluation
In this section, I use the model to test whether the insurance within the firm will be
crowded out by social insurance. I evaluate a more generous revenue-neutral unem-
ployment insurance policy – the flow payment while unemployed is increased by 20%.
In order to finance UI benefits, the government collects lump sum tax Ω from all firms
that are in production. Revenue-neutral Ω is solved in the estimated model. Such
policy provides better social insurance when workers are unemployed, which raises the
value of the worker’s outside options. Then, workers are more likely to shirk their
effort, and thus, firms have a greater incentive to adjust wages.
I report the results in the column “High UI” of Table 12. First, understanding
that the government is providing more insurance, firms choose to pass on more of the
aggregate shocks to their workers. The result is an increase in the wage cyclicality: the
wage elasticity to GDP increases by 6% for postgraduates and 5% for undergraduates.
Thus, unemployment insurance crowds out firm insurance, but to a less extent for
undergraduates. Second, as the generosity of UI increases, the unemployment duration
increases by 6% for postgraduates and 5% for undergraduates. Therefore the moral
hazard effect of UI is stronger for postgraduates.
In Table 12, I also compute the worker’s willingness to pay for such a policy for
each education group.31 For a 20% increase in the UI benefit, postgraduates are willing
to pay 0.27% of their consumption, whereas undergraduates workers are willing to
pay 0.50% of their consumption. Hence, the welfare gain of undergraduates from
such a policy is 85% higher than that of postgraduates, which supports the argument
that the unemployment insurance replacement rate should be lower for postgraduates












where the subscript d refers to the baseline economy (d = 1) or an alternative more generous economy
(d = 2). Now define π as the proportion of consumption an individual is willing to pay to be indifferent
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Table 10: Parameter Estimates (On-the-job Search)
Parameters Value s.e.
Persistence of aggregate productivity ρz .989 .007
Std. of shock to aggregate productivity σz .004 .002
Vacancy posting cost η .523 .327
Flow payment while unemployed b .090 .127
Level of effort cost c0 .126 .106
Curvature of effort cost c1 .261 .077
Risk aversion γ 1.158 .230
General skills of postgraduates hP G 1.233 .068
On-the-job search efficiency κ .988 .116
Initial productivity gap
Postgraduate τP G .504 .077
Undergraduate τBA .221 .080
Table 11: Model Fit (On-the-job Search)
Moments Data Model
Postgraduates
Employment separation rate .005 .005
Job finding rate .244 .256
Job-to-job transition rate .018 .019
Return to the first year of tenure .077 .076
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .342 .355
Undergraduates
Employment separation rate .007 .007
Job finding rate .258 .300
Job-to-job transition rate .019 .018
Return to the first year of tenure .056 .058
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .342 .355
Common moments
Median postgraduate wage premium 1.23 1.23
std [GDP ] .024 .021
autocorr [GDP ] .954 .966
Notes. The elasticity of median postgraduate wage w.r.t. GDP is not targeted in the estimation.
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(a regressive UI replacement rate). Furthermore, I analyze the effect of the same
policy in a model where there is no difference in the specific human capital between
postgraduates and undergraduates. Specifically, I assume postgraduate jobs require
the same low level of specific capital as undergraduate jobs. Then, for a 20% increase
in the UI benefit, postgraduates are willing to pay 0.47% of their consumption, which
is similar to undergraduates (0.50%). Therefore, it is crucial to take into account the
educational differences in the specific capital while evaluating such a policy.
Table 12: Raise UI replacement rate
Moments Baseline High UI % change
Postgraduates
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .367 .389 6%
Unemployment duration 4.08 4.33 6%
Willingness to pay .27%
Undergraduates
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .582 .612 5%
Unemployment duration (months) 3.81 3.99 5%
Willingness to pay .50%
Note. “Baseline”: baseline calibration; “High UI”: 20% increase in the UI benefit; “% change”:
percentage change in values between “High UI” and “Baseline”.
9 Evaluating Other Potential Explanations
This section evaluates the plausibility of other potential explanations for the counter-
cyclical postgraduate wage premium. In particular, I use my model to evaluate two
alternative explanations that are based on differences in job profitability and hiring
costs. I re-estimate the model under each of these alternative hypotheses and then
confront the obtained simulation results with empirical evidence.
between environment d = 2 and d = 1. This is implicitly defined by
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9.1 Differences in the Profitability of Jobs
A possible explanation for why postgraduates have smaller cyclical wage shocks than
their undergraduate counterparts might be related to the higher profitability of their
jobs. In the terminology of search models, postgraduates might have a lower flow pay-
ment while unemployed bP G. In my baseline simulation, I ruled out this possibility
by assuming the proportionality between the flow payment and the amount of general
skills across education groups in Equation (18). Here I relax the proportionality as-
sumption between postgraduates and undergraduates. To test this hypothesis, I first
assign postgraduates and undergraduates the same level of specific capital. Then, in-
stead of assuming proportionality bP G = b∗hP G in the baseline, I recalibrate the model
and search for the value of bP G. I find bP G = 0.142, which is about 60% of that for
undergraduates. At the same time, the model counterfactually predicts that the elas-
ticity of median postgraduate wage w.r.t. GDP is 0.507, which is about 50% higher
than the value in the data (0.340). Therefore, differences in the profitability of jobs
can not explain the counter-cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium.
9.2 Differences in Hiring Costs
Another possible explanation might be that postgraduates have higher hiring costs.
In my baseline simulation, I already assumed that the vacancy posting cost grew pro-
portionally with the amount of general skills in Equation (17). However, it might
understate the true differences in hiring costs between postgraduates and undergrad-
uates. I assign postgraduates and undergraduates the same level of specific capital. I
search for the value of ηP G that generates the empirical postgraduate wage elasticity
instead of assuming proportionality, i.e. ηP G = η ∗ hP G. I find η
P G = 1.74, which
is about 70% larger than that for undergraduates. The model now counterfactually
predicts that the elasticity of median postgraduate wage w.r.t. GDP is 0.542, which is
about 60% higher than the value in the data (0.340). Therefore, hiring costs can not
explain the counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium.
9.3 Other Alternative Explanations
The model presented in this paper cannot be used to quantitatively examine all al-
ternative explanations for counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium. Here I briefly




One possibility for why the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical is that the
relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates declines in recessions, and thus,
the postgraduate wage increases relative to the undergraduate wage. Therefore, I
test whether the relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates is pro-cyclical.
Figure 4 plot the detrended real GDP and the relative supply of postgraduates to
undergraduates. The relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates increases in
all of the recessions except the recent Great Recession, and its correlation with real
GDP is -0.32, indicating that the relative supply of postgraduates to undergraduates
is largely counter-cyclical.
Figure 4: Detrended Real GDP and the Relative Supply of PG to BA
Notes. March CPS 1976–2016, males aged 26–64. NBER recessions are shaded. Series are logged and
detrended using a Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter with parameter 100.
9.3.2 Risk Aversion
Another explanation is that this phenomenon is an endogenous outcome resulting from
differences in risk aversion between postgraduates and undergraduates. I test for this
37
argument using the 1992-2014 US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and restricting
the sample to males aged 50-64.32 On entering the study, each HRS respondent is
asked the following question: “Suppose that you are the only income earner in the
family, and you have a good job guaranteed to give you your current (family) income
every year for life. You are given the opportunity to take a new and equally good job,
with a 50-50 chance it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance that it
will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you take the new job?” Depending
on how they answer, respondents are then asked about jobs that give a 50-50 chance
of doubling income or of cutting it by 20 percent or 50 percent. Following Schulhofer-
wohl (2011), I classify those who reject any risky job as having high risk aversion (risk
aversion = 1), and those who accept any risky job as having low risk aversion (risk
aversion = 0). The mean of this binary variable is 0.52 for both the postgraduates and
undergraduates, i.e. 48% reject even the job that might cut income by 20 percent. It
shows undergraduates and postgraduates share the same level of risk aversion.
9.3.3 Industries and Occupations
One concern is that postgraduates and undergraduates have different wage cyclicality
because they work in different industries and occupations that are subject to different
productivity shocks. If this is the case, then within each industry and occupation,
there will be no such differences in wage cyclicality. To test whether this argument
holds, I run the wage regression (1) by major industries and occupations. The up-
per panel of Table 13 presents the estimates by major industries. It shows that the
postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical in all sub-industry categories. The
lower panel presents the estimates by major occupations. It shows that the postgradu-
ate wage premium is counter-cyclical in Managerial, Professional Specialty, Technical,
and Sales occupations, which added up to 82% of all college graduates. Therefore, this
phenomenon is not caused by the different cyclicality of industry-specific or occupation-
specific shocks experienced by postgraduates and undergraduates.
Next, I run a series of regressions including industry and occupation fixed effects.
Table 14 shows the results. Column (1) shows the baseline estimates without controlling
for industries or occupations. When I control for 2-digit industries (43 categories) in
Column (2), the coefficient γ on PGit × Ut shrinks slightly from 0.0086 to 0.0076.
When I control for 2-digit occupations (60 categories) in Column (3), the coefficient γ
32See Appendix A.5 for a description of the HRS data.
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Table 13: Wage Regression at the Industry/Occupation Level






Nondurable Mfg. -.0121*** .0163*** 5.95% 29.76%
(.0039) (.0026)
Durable Mfg. -.0152*** .0126*** 11.51% 32.25%
(.0026) (.0023)
T.C.U -.0080** .0103*** 7.25% 23.23%
(.0036) (.0025)
F.I.R -.0186*** .0101*** 9.54% 28.79%
(.0034) (.0025)
Services -.0139*** .0082*** 40.79% 53.26%
(.0019) (.0021)
Trade -.0151*** .0047** 11.79% 19.40%
(.0032) (.0026)
Public Admin. -.0018 .0066*** 8.48% 38.78%
(.0026) (.0022)
A.M.C .0005 .0122*** 4.69% 23.15%
(.0047) (.0029)
by Occupation
Managerial -.0125*** .0110*** 29.07% 36.81%
(.0019) (.0021)
Professional -.0131*** .0087*** 36.35% 56.44%
(.0019) (.0021)
Technical -.0087** .0056** 5.48% 31.29%
(.0037) (.0025)
Sales -.0121*** .0065** 11.06% 18.44%
(.0034) (.0026)
Service & Admin. -.0105*** .0006 9.98% 20.30%
(.0029) (.0025)
P.C.R -.0126*** .0007 4.13% 15.88%
(.0044) (.0031)
O.F.L -.0067 -.0071** 3.94% 16.53%
(.0049) (.0033)
Notes. BAI +P GI∑
I
BAI +P GI
: the proportion of Industry/Occupation I among all college graduates.
P GI
BAI +P GI
: the ratio of postgraduates to college graduates in Industry/Occupation I. T.C.U: Trans-
portation, Communications and Utilities. F.I.R: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate. A.M.C: Agri-
culture, Mining and Construction. P.C.R: Precision production, Craft and Repair. O.F.L: Operators,
Fabricators and Labourers. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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shrinks to 0.0065. In Column (4), I include both 2-digit occupations and industries,
and the coefficient γ shrinks to 0.0061. In Column (5), I include more dis-aggregated
3-digit industries (237 categories), and the coefficient γ shrinks to 0.0068. In Column
(6), I include 3-digit occupations (384 categories), and the coefficient γ shrinks to
0.0055. Finally, in Column (7), I include both 3-digit occupations and industries, and
the coefficient γ shrinks to 0.0052. Therefore, the different occupation and industry
composition of postgraduates and undergraduates can not fully explain the result.
Table 14: Controlling for Industry and Occupation Fixed Effects
lnWage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
URATE -.0124*** -.0116*** -.0113*** -.0109*** -.0110*** -.0100*** -.0100***
(.0012) (.0012) (.0011) (.0011) (.0012) (.0011) (.0011)
PG × URATE .0086*** .0076*** .0065*** .0061*** .0068*** .0055*** .0052***
(.0021) (.0020) (.0019) (.0018) (.0019) (.0018) (.0018)
Industries, 43 categ/s X X
Occupations, 60 categ/s X X
Industries, 237 categ/s X X
Occupations, 384 categ/s X X
Notes. Sample is males aged 26–64 not self-employed. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
10 Conclusion
I document a new result: in the US, the postgraduate wage premium is counter-
cyclical — postgraduates have smaller cyclical wage variation than undergraduates,
and the difference in wage cyclicality rises with job tenure. As workers’ job tenure
is the generally used proxy for specific human capital, I argue that this phenomenon
occurs because postgraduates accumulate more specific capital than undergraduates. I
provide robust empirical evidence that postgraduate jobs require more specific capital
than undergraduate jobs, and the type of specific capital that causes the difference
between postgraduates and undergraduates is more likely to be of firm-specific nature.
To understand how specific capital affects labour turnover and wage cyclicality, I de-
velop an equilibrium search model with risk averse workers and imperfect monitoring of
worker effort. Imperfect monitoring creates a moral hazard problem that requires firms
to pay efficiency wages. Firms face the trade-off between increasing wage stability to
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provide insurance to workers and increasing wage cyclicality to incentivize their work-
ers to exert the optimal effort. The theoretical implication of the model is that more
specific capital leads to lower probability of employment separation, thereby increasing
both the effectiveness and the marginal cost of providing incentives for worker effort.
Then it is optimal for firms to provide more insurance rather than more incentives.
Therefore, more specific capital leads to more stable wages.
I quantify the level of specific human capital by education in the data and use
it to parameterize my model. The model can capture differences in wage cyclicality
and labour turnover between education groups, indicating that specific capital can
be an important driving force. The paper implies that undergraduates receive less
insurance within firms than postgraduates, hence increasing the demand for social
insurance among this group. I analyze the impact of an increase in the unemployment
insurance replacement rate. I find such a policy crowds out wage insurance provided
by firms, but the effect is smaller for undergraduates. Furthermore, the welfare gain
of undergraduates from such a policy is 85% higher than that of postgraduates, which
supports the argument for a lower UI replacement rate for postgraduates.
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A Additional Details on Data
A.1 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (March CPS)
The CPS is a monthly survey designed to be representative of the civilian non-institutional
population. In March every year the CPS fields the Annual Social and Economic sup-
plement (March CPS), which collects detailed demographic data for each household
member and labor force and income information for each household member age 15 or
older. I use the March CPS data prepared by IPUMS (https://cps.ipums.org/cps/),
which are available at the state level starting in 1976. Labor force and income informa-
tion correspond to the previous year. I use the March supplement weights to produce
my estimates on wage cyclicality.
Here I describe the selection of variables. For education groups, I use the IPUMS
variable EDUC which is a combination of two other variables, HIGRADE and EDUC99.
HIGRADE is available for years prior to 1992 and gives the respondent’s highest grade
of school or year of college completed. EDUC99 is available beginning in 1992 and
classifies high school graduates according to their highest degree or diploma attained.
My education groups consist of: i) noncollege workers (3 years of college completed and
less according to HIGRADE; some college / associate’s degree and less according to
EDUC99); ii) college graduates (4 years of college completed according to HIGRADE;
bachelor’s degree according to EDUC99); iii) postgraduates (5 years of college com-
pleted and more according to HIGRADE; master’s, professional school and doctoral
degrees according to EDUC99).
Recall that I compute an individual’s wage as annual earnings divided by annual
hours worked. To compute hours worked last year, I multiply the IPUMS variable
WKSWORK1 (weeks worked last year) by UHRSWORKLY (usual hours worked per
week last year). In Table A.5, earnings is labour income. For years prior to 1988, labour
income = INCWAGE. Beginning in 1988, labour income = INCLONGJ (if SRCEARN
= 1) + OINCWAGE. Here INCWAGE = income from wage and salary; INCLONGJ =
earnings from longest job before deductions; OINCWAGE = income from other wage
and salary; SRCEARN = 1 indicates source of earnings from longest job is wage and
salary.
In the CPS, top-code thresholds vary widely across income categories, and across
time. Following Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010), I deal with top-coded observa-
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tions by assuming the underlying distribution for each component of income is Pareto,
and forecast the mean value for top-coded observations by extrapolating a Pareto den-
sity fitted to the non-top-coded upper end of the observed distribution.
A.2 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS)
The DWS is another supplement to the CPS administered in the January or February of
every even year. The DWS identifies displaced workers who have been separated from
their employers due to (i) insufficient demand for the worker’s services, (ii) the worker’s
position being abolished, or (iii) the worker’s plant closing — reasons which have been
taken by the literature to instrument for “exogenous” layoffs. The DWS inherits the
large sample size and representative structure of the CPS. I restrict the sample to
those who lost a full-time job and are currently full-time reemployed. This is necessary
because I observe hours worked only for the current job, not for the predisplacement
job. Weekly wage is therefore the only wage measure available for both the pre- and
the postdisplacement job. All earnings are deflated to constant 2000 dollars.
A.3 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
The PSID is a longitudinal study of US households and individuals. The original
1968 sample was drawn from two independent sub-samples: an over-sample of roughly
2000 poor families selected from the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO), and
a nationally representative sample of roughly 3000 families designed by the Survey
Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan. In 1997, the SEO sample was
reduced by one-half. In 1990, PSID added 2000 Latino households, including families
originally from Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. While this sample (the so-called
“Latino sample”) did represent three major groups of immigrants, it missed out on
the full range of post-1968 immigrants, Asians in particular. Because of this crucial
shortcoming, and a lack of sufficient funding, the Latino sample was dropped after
1995. A sample of 441 immigrant families, including Asians, was added in 1997 (the
so-called “Immigrant sample”).
Since 1968, the PSID has interviewed individuals from families in the initial samples.
Adults have been followed as they have grown older, and children have been observed
as they have advanced into adulthood, forming family units of their own (the “split-
offs”). Survey waves are annual from 1968 to 1997, and biennial since then. Although
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the PSID provides a wide variety of information about all individuals in the family
unit, the greatest level of detail is ascertained for the primary adult in the family
unit, i.e., the head33. In the PSID all the questions are retrospective, i.e., variables in
survey-year t refer to calendar year t − 1. The interview is usually conducted around
March.
I base my empirical analysis on the SRC sample. I use all the yearly surveys from
1985–1996 and the biennial surveys from 1997-2015. I use the data after 1985 for the
following three reasons: (1) the variable for the highest degree received is only available
since 1985; (2) although the variable for the years of education is available since 1968,
it was only in 1975 and 1985 that the education of the existing heads of household was
re-asked; (3) in my sample, almost no one has more than 16 years of education before
1983, which is not useful for the analysis of postgraduates.
I restrict the sample to male heads aged 26 to 64 who were not self-employed, and
I only use the first spell I observe someone as a head. Wages are annual hourly wages
(annual labour earnings divided by annual hours). Nominal wages are deflated by the
Consumer Price Index. The base year is 2000. I also restrict the sample to hourly wage
less than or equal to $100. Workers whose hourly wage rate was below $1 (in 2000
dollars) or less than half of the corresponding federal minimum wage in that year are
viewed as non-employed. I create consistent measure of age: I determine the age in the
first year the respondent was a head, and then increment age by 1 for each subsequent
year the respondent was a head.
The PSID does not identify the employers of individuals. In addition, the reported
employer tenure values in PSID often rise by substantially more or substantially less
than 1 year. I identify the sequence of jobs (employers) held by each individual and
create a consistent tenure measure following the procedure described in the supple-
mentary files of Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013), which can be downloaded from
https://www.econometricsociety.org/content/supplement-modeling-earnings-dynamics-
0.
33The head of the family unit (FU) must be at least 16 years old, and the person with the most
financial responsibility in the FU. If this person is female and she has a husband in the FU, then he
is designated as head. If she has a boyfriend with whom she has been living for at least one year,
then he is head. However, if she has 1) a husband or a boyfriend who is incapacitated and unable to
fulfill the functions of head, 2) a boyfriend who has been living in the FU for less than a year, 3) no
husband/boyfriend, then the FU will have a female head. A new head is selected if last year’s head
moved out of the household unit, died or became incapacitated, or if a single female head has gotten
married. Also, if the family is a split-off family (hence a new family unit in the sample), then a new
head is chosen.
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A.4 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequalities (MCSUI)
The MCSUI Survey was collected in four large US cities: Los Angeles, Boston, De-
troit and Atlanta. The data collection comprises data for two surveys: a survey of
households (Part 1) and a survey of employers (Part 2). The data in Part 2 represent
a telephone survey of 3510 current business establishments in Atlanta, Boston, De-
troit, and Los Angeles carried out between spring 1992 and spring 1995 to learn about
hiring and vacancies. An employer size-weighted, stratified, probability sample (ap-
proximately two-thirds of the cases) was drawn from regional employment directories,
and a probability sample (the other third of the cases) was drawn from the current
or most recent employer reported by respondents to the household survey in Part 1.
The sampling procedure and the provided weights intend to represent employees who
worked in the 4 cities. Screening methods were used to identify a respondent who
actually carried out hiring for the relevant job. The survey was conducted over the
telephone, using an instrument that typically took 30 to 45 minutes to administer.
Employers were queried about characteristics of their firms, including composition of
the firm’s labor force, vacant positions, the person most recently hired and his or her
salary, hours worked per week, educational qualifications, promotions, and the firm’s
recruiting and hiring methods. I use the part of the survey that asked employers about
their most recently hired worker to construct measures of specific capital in this paper.
A.5 Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
The HRS is a national longitudinal study of Americans aged 50 or older. It begun in
1992 and designed to investigate health and economic consequences of older individuals
as they advance from work to retirement. It also includes experimental questions
that give evidence on respondents’ preferences. The original HRS cohort consisted of
individuals born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses. A sample of individuals
born before 1923 was added soon thereafter. An additional sample of individuals born
between 1923 and 1930 was added in 1998. Baseline surveys were conducted face-to-
face. Follow-up interviews were completed by telephone or mail. The HRS has been
repeated every 2 years since 1992, and data between 1992 and 2014 are used in this
study.
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B Additional Details on Empirical Facts
B.1 Use GDP as a Business Cycle Proxy
Instead of the unemployment rate, I use log real GDP as an indicator of the business
cycle and run the following regression
ln Wit = θPGit + α ln GDPt + γPGit × ln GDPt + Xitβ + εit
α indicates the relation between the undergraduate wage and GDP. For instance, a
positive estimate of α would imply that the average real wage of undergraduates in-
creases when GDP rises, i.e. the undergraduate wage is pro-cyclical. The coefficients
γ captures the difference between the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage and the
undergraduate wage, and α + γ indicates the cyclicality of the postgraduate wage. A
negative estimate of γ would indicate a counter-cyclical postgraduate wage premium —
the premium decreases when GDP rises. The estimates are in Table A.1. It shows that
when real GDP increases by 1%, the postgraduate wage increases by 0.403% and the
undergraduate wage increases by 0.988%, confirming the finding that the postgraduate
wage is less pro-cyclical than the undergraduate wage.




PG × lnGDP (γ) -.584***
(.119)
α + γ .403***
(.094)
Observations 364,864
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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B.2 Sample with Females Included
The baseline sample includes males only. Here I run regression (1) using the sample
with both males and females included. Column (2) of Table A.2 presents the esti-
mates. The estimated coefficient γ on the interaction term PGit × Ut is 0.0062 (s.e.
0.0015), indicating that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point in
a downturn, postgraduates face a 0.62% increase in their real wage relative to that of
undergraduates. Therefore, the postgraduate wage premium is counter-cyclical in the
sample with females included.
Table A.2: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage Baseline All Cubic Detrend Median
URATE (α) -.0124*** -.0086*** -.0105*** -.0099***
(.0012) (0009) (.0011) (.0013)
PG × URATE (γ) .0086*** .0062*** .0064*** .0074***
(.0021) (.0015) (.0017) (.0021)
α + γ -.0038** -.0024** -.0041*** -.0026
(.0017) (.0012) (.0014) (.0017)
Observations 364,864 691,759 364,864 364,864
(5) (6) (7) (8)
lnWage Low wage Private Sector 26-40 41-64
URATE (α) -.0127*** -.0143*** -.0157*** -.0094***
(.0014) (.0014) (.0016) (0019)
PG × URATE (γ) .0088*** .0097*** .0086*** .0070**
(.0022) (.0026) (.0029) (.0029)
α + γ -.0038** -.0045** -.0071*** -.0023
(.0018) (.0022) (.0024) (.0023)
Observations 366,685 271,085 176,710 188,154
Notes. (1)Baseline: Males aged 26–64 not self-employed; (2)All: Sample with both males and females
included; (3)Cubic Detrend: Unemployment rate is detrended by a cubic trend; (4)Median regression;
(5)Low wage: Add observations whose hourly wage was less than half the legal minimum; (6)Private
sector only; (7)Aged 26-40; (8)Aged 41-64. Controls: postgraduate degree, state, race, and mar-
riage dummies, a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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B.3 Robustness
In column (3) of Table A.2, I detrend the aggregate unemployment rate using a cubic
time trend and find that when the unemployment rate goes up by 1 percentage point,
postgraduates face a 0.64% increase in their real wage relative to that of undergradu-
ates. In column (4), I run a median regression and find that when the unemployment
rate goes up by 1 percentage point, the median wage of postgraduates increases by
0.74% relative to that of undergraduates. In column (5), I add observations whose
hourly wage was less than half the legal minimum in that year and find that the
counter-cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium is the same as the baseline. In
column (6), I further restrict the sample to private sector workers and find that the
counter-cyclicality of the postgraduate wage premium increases slightly. In column (7)
and (8), I cut the baseline sample into 2 age groups. I find that when the unemploy-
ment rate goes up by 1 percentage point, postgraduates aged 26-40 face a 0.86% wage
increase relative to undergraduates in the same age group, and postgraduates aged 41-
64 face a 0.70% relative wage increase. So having a postgraduate degree significantly
reduces wage cyclicality for both age groups.
B.4 Unemployment Risk
One concern is that undergraduates are more likely to be unemployed than postgrad-
uates in recessions. To address this concern, I calculate the Employment to Unem-
ployment (EU) probability for postgraduates and undergraduates using monthly CPS
from 1979-2014. The CPS reports the labor market status of the respondents each
month. In particular, in any given month a civilian can be in one of three labor
force states: employed (E), unemployed (U), and not in the labor force (N). House-
holds are interviewed for four consecutive months, rotate out for eight months and
then rotate in for another four months. I download monthly CPS data from NBER
(http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html), merge them to create a short panel, and
use it to calculate transition rates by individual workers between these three labor
market states (see Madrian and Lefgren, 1999 for a further discussion of the issues
involved in linking individuals across months in the monthly CPS files.) Next I use
the X13-ARIMA-SEATS procedure to perform seasonal adjustment for all transition
rates. Then I make the time-aggregation adjustment for the transition rates following
Shimer (2012).
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Figure A.1 plots the EU transition probability by education. The monthly tran-
sition probabilities are somewhat noisy, and here I plot the quarterly average of the
monthly results. Both time series increase during recessions and exhibit a counter-
cyclical pattern of employment separation.
Figure A.1: Employment to Unemployment Transition Probability by Education
Source. Data is Monthly CPS 1979–2014, males aged 26–64. NBER dated recessions are shaded.
Quarterly average of monthly data.
To account for the differences in unemployment risk, I run three regressions. First,
I control for the number of weeks unemployed during the prior year as well as a dummy
for working part-time vs. full-time in the prior year. Column (2) of Table A.3 shows
that the coefficient γ on PGit × Ut shrinks slightly from 0.0086 to 0.0077. Second, I
run regression (1) with only job stayers – workers who stayed in the same job last year,
had no stretch of looking for work, and worked for 52 weeks. This essentially compares
average postgraduates with good undergraduates, so the estimated coefficient should be
smaller. Column (3) of Table A.3 shows that the coefficient γ shrinks slightly to 0.0069
(s.e. 0.0022). Third, I use a maximum likelihood version of Heckman (1979) selection
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Table A.3: Unemployment Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnWage Baseline Weeks Unemployed Job Stayers Heckman
URATE (α) -.0124*** -.0111*** -.0106*** -.0121***
(.0012) (.0012) (.0013) (.0012)
PG × URATE (γ) .0086*** .0077*** .0069*** .0084***
(.0021) (.0020) (.0022) (.0021)
α + γ -.0038** -.0034** -.0037** -.0037**
(.0017) (.0017) (.0018) (.0017)
Observations 364,864 364,864 289,878 395,181
Notes. (1)Baseline: Males aged 26–64 not self-employed; (2)Weeks Unemployed: Control for the
number of weeks unemployed as well as a dummy for working part-time vs. full-time; (3)Job Stayers:
Workers had only 1 employer, no stretch of looking for work, and worked for 52 weeks; (4)Heckman:
Heckman selection model with first-stage employment choice. Controls: postgraduate degree, state,
race, and marriage dummies, a cubic age trend and a quartic time trend. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
model. This model estimates a wage equation jointly with probit choice equation that
determines whether a worker is employed. The model is written as follows:
ln Wit =θPGit + αUt + γPGit × Ut + Xitβ + εit,
observed iff Pit = 1,





1 if P ∗it ≥ 0
0 if P ∗it < 0
Here P ∗it is the latent index of a probit employment equation that determines whether
worker i is employed at time t. Zit is a vector of individual-specific regressors that
affect the probability of employment. Typically, it contains elements that enter into
Xit as well as some additional variables that may affect labour supply propensity
but not worker productivity. The additional variables are: number of own children
in the household, number of own children under age 5 in the household, and age of
youngest own child in the household. The error terms εit and ωit are assumed to have
a bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ and respective standard deviations
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σǫ and 1. The latter variance is normalized to one for identification of the probit choice
equation. Column (4) of Table A.3 presents the estimates that when the unemployment
rate goes up by 1 percentage point, postgraduates face a 0.84% wage increase relative
to undergraduates, which is similar to the baseline.
B.5 Change in Log Wages
Figure A.2 plots the average annual changes in log wages between booms and recessions.
I use March CPS 1976–2016 and recessions years are 1980-1983, 1990-1992, 2001-2002
and 2008-2010. The figure shows a considerable difference in wage growth rates between
undergraduates and postgraduates. Undergraduates have a larger wage growth rate
than postgraduates in booms and a smaller (even negative) wage growth rate than
postgraduates in recessions. The wage growth rates for postgraduates are relatively
more stable over the business cycle than those for undergraduates.
Figure A.2: Change in log wages: Booms versus Recessions
B.6 Worker Flows
Table A.4 shows unemployment rates and worker flows for males aged 26-64. Postgrad-
uates have lower unemployment rate, employment separation rate, job finding rate, and
job-to-job transition rate than undergraduates.
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Table A.4: Unemployment Rates and Monthly Worker Flows
Education Undergrad. Postgrad.
Unemployment rate 2.9% 2.0%
Employment separation rate 0.7% 0.5%
Job finding rate 25.8% 24.4%
Job-to-job transition rate 1.9% 1.8%
Source. Job-to-job transition rate uses Monthly CPS 1994-2014. Other variables use Monthly CPS
1979–2014. Males aged 26-64.
B.7 Return to Tenure
Topel (1991) proposed a two-stage estimator to obtain the return to tenure. A basic
model of wage determination is









where Wijt denotes real hourly wage for individual i on job j at time t, Xijt is total
labor market experience, and Tijt is current job tenure. The model is underidentified by
one parameter because linear terms in experience and tenure are perfectly correlated
within jobs.
The first step estimates the combined effect of the linear experience and tenure
terms (β = β1 + β2). As PSID becomes biennial after 1997, I calculate the 2-year
difference in within-job wages and run the following regression for workers who do not
change jobs
ln Wijt+2 − ln Wijt = 2β + 4θ1 (Xijt + 1) + 4θ2 (Tijt + 1)
+ θ3
(




6T 2ijt + 12Tijt + 8
)
+ εijt+2 − εijt
where εijt+2 − εijt has mean zero. In a second step one estimates the linear experience
coefficient (β1) by applying OLS to
y0ijt = β1X0ijt + εijt (19)
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ijt is the initial wages on new
jobs, and X0ijt is the initial experience on the job.
34 Finally, the linear tenure slope
(β2) is estimated as β̂ − β̂1.
B.8 Necessity of Specific Capital and Adaptation Period
I regress the level of necessity of specific capital on a postgraduate degree dummy and
demographic controls. Column (1) of Table A.5 presents the estimates. The estimated
coefficient on the postgraduate degree dummy is 0.210 (s.e. 0.092). So for a one unit
increase in the postgraduate degree dummy (i.e., going from 0 to 1), we expect a 0.210
increase in the level of necessity of specific capital, i.e. postgraduate jobs require more
specific capital than undergraduate jobs. Next I run the same regression for adaptation
period. Column (2) shows that the estimated coefficient on the postgraduate degree
dummy is 26.186 (s.e. 5.560). So for a one unit increase in the postgraduate degree
dummy, we expect a 26 weeks increase in the adaptation period.
B.9 Effort Level and Profit-sharing
MCSUI Survey asked employers “When people have been discharged form this type of
job, how frequently has it been due to general lack of effort or poor quality of work?
Would you say (1) very often, (2) sometimes, (3) occasionally, or (4) never?” I use it
to measure the effort level, and a higher score indicates that the worker exert a higher
effort. I use the regression coefficients reported in Column (3) of Table A.5 to calculate
the predicted value for postgraduate jobs and undergraduate jobs respectively. Row
(1) of Table A.6 shows that the effort level of postgraduates (2.3) is higher than that
of undergraduates (2.1). Therefore, postgraduates exert a higher effort in their jobs
than undergraduates.
MCSUI Survey also asked employers “Is there is profit-sharing [in this job]?” I run
the same regression as above for the indicator of profit-sharing. Column (4) of Table
A.5 shows the estimated coefficient and Row (2) of Table A.6 shows the predicted value:
34The derivation of Equation (19) is




























Table A.5: Regressions of Necessity of Specific Capital and Adaptation Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Necessity Adaptation Effort Profit-sharing
Postgraduate .210** 26.186*** .222** -.099**
(.092) (5.560) (.112) (.046)
Nonwhite -.186** -1.768 .175* -.044
(.081) (4.876) (.099) (.042)
Age/10 1.926*** 6.094 .179 .165
(.300) (17.757) (.364) (.147)
Age/10, squared -.237*** -1.092 -.001 -.025
(.041) (2.4071) (.049) (.020)
Female .209*** -9.088** .072 .006
(.076) (4.579) (.093) (.038)
Constant -.590 26.509 1.443** -.008
(.522) (30.908) (.632) (.256)
Observations 566 533 549 483
Source. MCSUI 1992-1994. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
the proportion of postgraduate jobs that is profit-sharing (0.137) is lower than that
of undergraduate jobs (0.236). Therefore, there is less profit-sharing in postgraduate
jobs.
C Model Appendix
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Let’s consider two distinct values of aggregate productivity z1 < z2. At z2, the firm
can adopt the optimal contract at z1, which is feasible and delivers the same value V
to the worker. As the transition matrix of z is assumed to be monotone,35 this strategy
generates a higher expected profit than Πh (s, z1, V ) – the pareto frontier at z1. As
this strategy has to be at most equal to Πh (s, z2, V ) – the pareto frontier at z2, we
have that Πh (s, z1, V ) < Π
h (s, z2, V ).
35A transition matrix is called monotone if each row stochastically dominates the row above.
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Table A.6: Effort Level and Profit-sharing
Postgrad. Undergrad. Diff.
(1) Effort level 2.320 2.098 .222**
(.099) (.052) (.112)
(2) Profit-sharing .137 .236 -.099**
(.041) (.021) (.046)
Source. MCSUI 1992-1994. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
Similarly, when matched with an experienced worker (s = 1), the firm can adopt
the optimal contract when it is matched with a new hire (s = 0). This strategy gen-
erates a higher expected profit than Πh (0, z, V ) – the pareto frontier when the firm
is matched with a new hire. As this strategy has to be at most equal to Πh (1, z, V )
– the pareto frontier when the firm is matched with an experienced worker, we have
that Πh (0, z, V ) < Πh (1, z, V ).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
From Equation (6), the firm’s value when match with a new hire is





1, z′, V h1z′
)
+ (1 − φi) Π
h
(
0, z′, V h0z′
)]
Let’s consider two distinct levels of specific capital ξ1 = (τ1, φ1) and ξ2 = (τ2, φ2). Let
ξ1 represent the lower level of specific capital, i.e. τ1 < τ2 and φ1 > φ2. It is feasible for
a firm that requires ξ1 to adopt the optimal contract designed for jobs that require ξ2,
i.e. offer the same wage scheme, recommend the same effort level, and deliver the same
value V to the new hire. As τ1 < τ2 , φ1 > φ2, and Π
h
(




0, z′, V h1z′
)
(Lemma 1), this strategy generates a higher expected profit than Πh (0, z, V ; ξ2) –
the pareto frontier for jobs that require ξ2. As this strategy has to be at most
equal to Πh (0, z, V ; ξ1) – the pareto frontier for jobs that require ξ1, we have that
Πh (0, z, V ; ξ2) < Π
h (0, z, V ; ξ1). As this is true for all aggregate state, the expected
value of a new job is lower in jobs that require greater specific capital, and thus, the
job finding rate is lower in every sub-market (Equation 9). Therefore, the worker’s
value in the equilibrium search market that requires ξ2 is lower than that requires ξ1.
As this is true for all aggregate productivity z and education h, by Equation (14), the
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expected value of the worker’s outside options is lower in jobs that require the higher
level of specific capital ξ2.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 2, greater specific capital reduces the expected value of the worker’s
outside options. By Equation (5), as the effort cost function is strictly increasing
and strictly convex, greater specific capital increases the optimal effort level of an
experienced worker. Furthermore, as the probability of project success r (.) is strictly
increasing in the level of effort, greater specific capital reduces employment separation.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 2
The first-order conditions for firm problem are
yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= κc′′ (e) (20)
e · ∂Πh
(






+ κ = 0 (21)
where κ is the multiplier on the incentive-compatibility constraint. The envelope con-
dition is
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c′′ (e)
From the envelope condition (22), I substitute the first term on the left with the inverse







yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
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s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
e · c′′ (e)
(23)
When yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
= 0, the wage will not change, i.e. ws′z′ = wsz.
Define w̃sz as the wage such that y
h (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
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increases with the level of aggregate productivity. At the same time,
as the flow output yh (s, z) is also strictly increasing in aggregate productivity, when
aggregate productivity increases, yh (s, z) + βEszΠ
h
(
s′, z′, V hs′z′
)
becomes positive. As







then ws′z′ > w̃sz by strict concavity. Therefore, the wage increases with the level of
aggregate productivity, and vice versa.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3



















1, z′, V h1z′
)]
(24)
where the left-hand side is the change in the inverse of the marginal utility of wages.
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (24) is worker’s optimal effort
which is equal to the probability of project success. From Proposition 1, experienced
workers working in jobs that require more specific capital exert a higher effort, i.e. 1/e
is smaller. The second term on the right-hand side is the response of an experienced
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dβEz
(









Assumption 1 indicates that c′′ (e) increases with the level of effort, i.e. 1/c′′ (e) is
smaller. Since the right-hand side becomes smaller, the change in the inverse of the
marginal utility of wages becomes smaller. Therefore, experienced workers working in
jobs that require greater specific capital have more stable wages.
Intuitively, experienced workers working in jobs that require more specific capital
have a higher probability of project success and a lower probability of employment
separation. Therefore, they will value more about firms’ future promises. As firms’
promises become more effective in motivating workers, firms do not need to give workers
a lot of incentives.
On the other hand, as e increases, the response of effort to incentives becomes
smaller, and thus, it becomes increasingly costly for firms to provide incentives for
worker effort. Therefore, greater specific capital increases the firm’s marginal cost of
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providing incentives.
Firms face the trade-off between the risk-sharing motive and the incentivizing mo-
tive. As greater specific capital increases both the effectiveness and the marginal
cost of providing incentives, it becomes optimal for firms to provide more insurance
rather than more incentives, i.e. smaller wage changes caused by changes in aggregate
productivity. Therefore, greater specific human capital increases wage stability of an
experienced worker.
D Estimation with 3 Education Groups
Here I estimate the model with three education groups: noncollege workers (NC), un-
dergraduates (BA), and postgraduates (PG). The additional externally estimated pa-
rameter is the upgrading probability of a new hired noncollege worker φNC , which is 0.18
from MCSUI Survey. I estimate the 3-education model in the same way when there are
only 2 education groups. Elasticities of median wage w.r.t. GDP for postgraduates and
noncollege workers are not targeted in the estimation. I use the simulated method of
moments to estimate the 12 parameters {ρz, σz, η, b, c0, c1, γ, τP G, τBA, τNC , hP G, hNC}.
The parameter estimates are displayed in Table A.7. The fitted moments are shown
in the Table A.8. The model fits the moments quite well. It can still capture the labour
turnover rates between postgraduates and undergraduates successfully. The employ-
ment separation rate for noncollege workers is lower than its counterpart in the US.
This is because, in this model, the probability of employment separation is affected by
worker effort. This suggests that the estimation might benefit from making the param-
eters for the effort cost function heterogeneous across education levels. On the other
hand, there are many other factors that might lead to higher employment separation
for noncollege workers, and thus, imposing an exogenous employment separation rate
would move the fit in the right direction.
63
Table A.7: Parameter Estimates for 3 Education Groups
Parameters Value s.e.
Persistence of aggregate productivity ρz .989 .006
Std. of shock to aggregate productivity σz .004 .002
Vacancy posting cost η .924 .467
Flow payment while unemployed b .226 .126
Level of effort cost c0 .355 .150
Curvature of effort cost c1 .103 .062
Risk aversion γ 1.157 .218
Initial productivity gap
Postgraduate τP G .351 .100
Undergraduate τBA .277 .087
Noncollege τNC .574 .075
General human capital
Postgraduate hP G 1.241 .068
Noncollege hNC .682 .083
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Table A.8: Model Fit for 3 Education Groups
Moments Data Model
Postgraduates
Employment separation rate .005 .005
Job finding rate .244 .244
Return to the first year of tenure .077 .076
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .342 .344
Undergraduates
Employment separation rate .007 .008
Job finding rate .258 .263
Return to the first year of tenure .056 .057
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .581 .558
Noncollege workers
Employment separation rate .016 .010
Job finding rate .272 .267
Return to the first year of tenure .043 .043
Elasticity of median wage w.r.t. GDP .569 .611
Common moments
Median postgraduate wage premium 1.23 1.23
Median undergraduate wage premium 1.48 1.46
std [GDP ] .024 .024
autocorr [GDP ] .954 .962
Notes. Elasticities of median wages for postgraduates and noncollege workers are not targeted in the
estimation.
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